Non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) such as
social distancing can have positive effects on the economy, through limiting
spikes in infections and avoiding mass casualties.
A study of the economic impact of the 1918 Spanish
Flu in the US has found those cities that implemented early and extensive NPIs
suffered no adverse economic effects over the medium term.
Cities that intervened earlier and more
aggressively actually experienced a relative increase in real economic activity
after the pandemic subsided.
The COVID-19 outbreak has sparked urgent questions
about the impact of pandemics, and associated countermeasures, on the real
economy. Policymakers are in uncharted territory, with little guidance on what
the expected economic fallout will be and how the crisis should be managed. In
this blog post, we use insights from a recent research paper to discuss two
sets of questions. First, what are the real economic effects of a pandemic—and
are these effects temporary or persistent? Second, how does the local public
health response affect the economic severity of the pandemic? In particular, do
non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) such as social distancing have economic
costs, or do policies that slow the spread of the pandemic also reduce its
economic severity?
In our paper, we study the economic effects of the
largest influenza pandemic in U.S. history, the 1918 Flu Pandemic which lasted
from January 1918 to December 1920, and spread worldwide. It is estimated that
about 500 million people, or one-third of the world’s population, became
infected with the virus, leading to at least 50 million deaths worldwide, with
550,000-675,000 occurring in the United States. The pandemic thus killed about
0.66 percent of the U.S. population, and, in particular, resulted in high death
rates for young (18-44) and healthy adults.
In our research, we exploit variation in both the
severity of the pandemic, as well as the speed and duration of NPIs implemented
to fight disease transmission across U.S. states and cities. NPIs implemented
in 1918 resemble many of the policies used to reduce the spread of COVID-19,
including closures of schools, theaters, and churches, bans on public
gatherings and funerals, quarantines of suspected cases, and restrictions on
business hours.
Our paper yields two main insights. First, we find
that areas that were more severely affected by the 1918 Flu Pandemic saw a
sharp and persistent decline in real economic activity. Second, we find that
cities that implemented early and extensive NPIs suffered no adverse economic
effects over the medium term. On the contrary, cities that intervened earlier
and more aggressively experienced a relative increase in real economic activity
after the pandemic subsided. Altogether, our findings suggest that pandemics
can have substantial economic costs, and NPIs can lead to both better economic
outcomes and lower mortality rates.
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Our two main findings are summarized in the chart
below, which shows the city-level correlation between 1918 flu mortality and
the growth in manufacturing employment from 1914 to 1919 (two census years). As
the chart reveals, higher mortality during the 1918 flu is associated with
lower economic growth. The chart further splits cities into two groups: those
with NPIs in place for longer (blue dots) and shorter periods of time (red
dots). Cities that implemented NPIs for longer tend to be clustered in the
upper-left region (low mortality, high growth), while cities with shorter NPI
periods are clustered in the lower-right region (high mortality, low growth).
This suggests that NPIs play a role in attenuating mortality, but without
reducing economic activity. If anything, cities with longer NPIs grow faster in
the medium term.
With respect to the economic effects of the
pandemic, we find that more severely affected areas experienced a relative
decline in manufacturing employment, manufacturing output, bank assets, and
durable goods consumption. Our regression estimates imply that the 1918 Flu
Pandemic led to an 18 percent reduction in manufacturing output for a state at
the mean level of exposure. Exposed areas also saw a rise in bank charge-offs,
reflecting an increase in business and household defaults. These patterns are
consistent with the notion that pandemics depress economic activity through
reductions in both supply and demand (Eichenbaum et al. 2020). Importantly, the
declines in all outcomes were persistent, and more affected areas remained
depressed relative to less exposed areas from 1919 through 1923.
The main concern with our empirical approach is
that areas with higher exposure to the 1918 Flu Pandemic may simultaneously be
more exposed to other economic shocks. However, although the outbreak was more
severe in the eastern United States, previous studies argue that the geographic
spread of the pandemic was somewhat arbitrary (Brainerd and Siegler 2003).
Consistent with this, we find that severely and moderately affected areas had
similar levels of population, employment, and income per capita before 1918. We
also find that the results are robust when controlling for time-varying shocks
that interact with a variety of local economic characteristics, including
states’ sectoral employment composition. The effects are also similar when
exploiting both city- and state-level variation in influenza exposure. Further,
the results are similar when using 1917 influenza mortality as an instrument
for 1918 mortality. This exercise utilizes variation in the 1918 flu driven by
local predisposition to influenza outbreaks due to climate, immunological, and
socioeconomic factors, which in ordinary years would not cause economic
disruption.
Consistent with this empirical evidence, the large
economic disruption caused by the pandemic is also evident in narrative
accounts from contemporaneous newspapers. For instance, on October 24, 1918,
the Wall Street Journal wrote:
Our second set of results center on the local
economic impact of public NPIs. In theory, the economic effects of NPIs could
be both positive and negative. All else equal, NPIs constrain social
interactions and thus dampen any economic activity that relies on such
interactions. However, in a pandemic, economic activity is also reduced in the
absence of such measures, as households reduce consumption and supply less
labor in order to reduce their risk of becoming infected. Thus, while NPIs
lower economic activity, they can solve the coordination problems associated
with fighting disease transmission and mitigate pandemic-related economic
disruption.
Comparing cities by the speed and aggressiveness
of NPIs, we find that early and forceful NPIs did not worsen the economic
downturn. On the contrary, cities that intervened earlier and more aggressively
experienced a relative increase in manufacturing employment, manufacturing
output, and bank assets in 1919, after the end of the pandemic.
Our regression estimates suggest that the effects
were economically sizable. Reacting ten days earlier to the arrival of the
pandemic in a given city increased manufacturing employment by around 5 percent
in the post-pandemic period. Likewise, implementing NPIs for an additional
fifty days increased manufacturing employment by 6.5 percent after the
pandemic.
Our findings are subject to the concern that
policy responses are endogenous and may be driven by factors that are related
to future economic outcomes, such as the baseline exposure of cities to
flu-related mortality, as well as differences in the quality of local
institutions and healthcare. This concern is somewhat mitigated by an insight
from the epidemiology literature: cities that were hit by later waves of the
pandemic—that is, those farther west—appear to have implemented NPIs faster,
having learned from the experiences of other cities (Hatchett et al. 2007).
Thus, as the flu moved from east to west, cities were much faster to implement
NPIs. The map below shows the intensity of local NPIs for the cities in our
sample, with cities in the west clearly responding to the arrival of the
pandemic with tighter NPIs. Importantly, we thus also show that our results are
robust when controlling for time-varying shocks that are correlated with the
differing characteristics of western and eastern cities, such as exposure to
agricultural shocks.
Due to the lack of higher frequency data, we
cannot pinpoint the exact dynamics and mechanism through which NPIs mitigate
the adverse economic consequences of a pandemic. However, the patterns we
identify in the data suggest that timely and aggressive NPIs can limit the most
disruptive economic effects of an influenza pandemic. The epidemiology
literature finds that early public health interventions reduce peak mortality
rates—flattening the curve—and lower cumulative mortality rates (Markel et al.
2007, Bootsmaa et al. 2007). Because pandemics are highly disruptive to the
local economy, these efforts can mitigate the abrupt disruptions to economic
activity that result from such shocks. As a result, the swift implementation of
NPIs can also contribute to “flattening the economic curve,” reinforcing the
effects of more traditional economic policy interventions (Gourinchas 2020).
Anecdotal evidence suggests that our results have
parallels in the COVID-19 outbreak. Governments that implemented NPIs swiftly,
such as those in Taiwan, China and Singapore, have not only limited infection
growth; they also appear to have mitigated the worst economic disruption caused
by the pandemic. For example, economist Danny Quah notes that Singapore's
management of COVID-19 has avoided major disruptions to economic activity
without leading to a sharp increase in infections through the use of forceful,
early interventions. Therefore, well-calibrated, early, and forceful NPIs
should not be seen as having major economic costs in a pandemic.
Altogether, our evidence implies that it’s the
pandemic and the associated spike in mortality that constitute the shock to the
economy. To the extent that NPIs are a means to attack the root of the problem,
mortality, they can also save the economy.
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